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Abstract
An interactive theorem prover, Isabelle, is under development. In LCF, each in-
ference rule is represented by one function for forwards proof and another (a tactic)
for backwards proof. In Isabelle, each inference rule is represented by a Horn clause.
Resolution gives both forwards and backwards proof, supporting a large class of logics.
Isabelle has been used to prove theorems in Martin-LÄof's Constructive Type Theory.
Quanti¯ers pose several di±culties: substitution, bound variables, Skolemization.
Isabelle's representation of logical syntax is the typed λ-calculus, requiring higher-
order uni¯cation. It may have potential for logic programming. Depth-¯rst subgoaling
along inference rules constitutes a higher-order Prolog.
0
Contents
1 Background 2
2 The LCF interactive theorem prover 2
2.1 Forwards proof and inference rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Quanti¯ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Backwards proof and tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Putting uni¯cation into LCF 6
4 Reasoning with inference rules 7
5 Formalizing quanti¯er rules 9
5.1 Substitution and the typed λ-calculus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2 Parameters and Skolemization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6 Higher-order uni¯cation 12
6.1 Huet's search procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6.2 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7 The implementation 15
8 Experiments with Constructive Type Theory 16
8.1 Constructive Type Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.2 Functions and the theory of expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8.3 The rules on the computer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.4 Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9 Related work 20
10 Future 21
1
1 Background
At least seven interactive theorem provers use the LCF framework. They di®er primarily
in what logic is used for conducting proofs. A new theorem prover, Isabelle, is intended
to unify these diverging paths.
A recurring theme will be the relationship between syntax and semantics. We compute
by means of syntax but think in terms of semantics. A system of inference rules is a
syntactic codi¯cation of semantic concepts, and must be shown to respect them. Sets and
functions are semantic; formal type theories and Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are syntactic.
The ultimate semantic notion is truth, faintly approximated by theorems of formal logic.
Regarding an axiom system as Holy Writ blurs the distinction. Martin-LÄof [22] discusses
the evolution of formal logic from an intuitionistic viewpoint. There are many distinct
semantic viewpoints, and accordingly many formal systems. A universal logic is too much
to hope for. However, we all seem to write down formal proofs in the same way: by joining
inference rules together.
Isabelle evolved by trial and error from implementations of Martin-LÄof's Constructive
Theory of Types. I started with ML and the LCF architecture, as described in the next
section. Attempts to put uni¯cation into LCF pushed theorems from the dominant posi-
tion, focusing attention on inference rules. Quanti¯ers posed an endless series of problems.
Martin-LÄof's syntactic theory of expressions, akin to the typed λ-calculus, gave a uniform
framework for bound variables and substitution. This required higher-order uni¯cation,
in general undecidable; the literature o®ered little practical advice. Quanti¯ers also intro-
duced dependencies between variables in the proof, requiring some form of Skolemization.
As an example, the rules of Martin-LÄof's Constructive Type Theory have been put
into Isabelle, with appropriate tactics. The types of many constructions can be inferred
automatically; simple functions can be derived interactively.
2 The LCF interactive theorem prover
Edinburgh LCF introduced a new approach to theorem proving: embed the formal logic in
a programmable meta language, ML [15]. Terms and formulas are values in ML: they have
an explicit tree structure and can be decomposed and built up by ML functions. Theorems
are values of an abstract data type thm. In place of arbitrary constructor functions,
inference rules map theorems to theorems. This is forwards proof. For backwards proof,
goals, subgoals, and tactics are implemented on top of this abstract type. Each rule checks
that it has received suitable premises, then generates the conclusion. Each tactic checks
that it has received a suitable goal, then generates the subgoals giving the corresponding
rule as validation. Milner [27] explains rules and tactics, while Gordon [12] works out the
representation of a simple logic in ML.
Recent LCF proofs involve denotational semantics, veri¯cation of functional programs,
and veri¯cation of digital circuits [30]. Logics include two versions of PPλ (for domain
theory) [15, 31], a Logic for Sequential Machines, two higher-order logics [8, 13], and
two constructive type theories [9, 32]. Implementing a logic is a major undertaking:
choosing a representation of formulas, implementing several dozen inference rules and
tactics, implementing many more derived rules and higher level tools, implementing a
theory database, writing a parser and printer, and documenting all these things.
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2.1 Forwards proof and inference rules
Inference rules are functions from theorems to theorems; axioms are the built-in theorems
of an LCF theory. Theorems can only be created by applying inference rules to axioms
and other theorems. The logic of Cambridge LCF is PPλ, for reasoning in domain theory.
The axiom of re°exivity for the partial ordering v is ` ∀x. x v x, which is bound to the
ML identi¯er LESS REFL of type thm. The rule of conjunction introduction,
¡ ` A ¢ ` B
¡,¢ ` A ∧B
is bound to the ML identi¯er CONJ of type thm → thm → thm.
In natural deduction, each theorem is proved with respect to a set of assumptions.
Conventional textbooks [38] treat the assumptions as leaves of the proof tree; when the
assumption is discharged, the leaf is crossed out. LCF attaches the assumptions directly
to the theorem, resulting in a sort of sequent calculus. The conjunction rule states that if
the premises are ` A and ` B with assumptions ¡ and ¢, then the conclusion is ` A ∧B
under the union ¡,¢ of those assumptions.
The incorrect use of a rule is rejected using ML's exception mechanism: a function can
fail instead of returning a result. The conjunction elimination rules are
¡ ` A ∧B
¡ ` A
¡ ` A ∧B
¡ ` B
They are implemented by ML functions of type thm → thm that fail if the argument is
not a conjunction. Modus Ponens, or implication elimination, is
¡ ` A⇒ B ¢ ` A
¡,¢ ` B
The function MP checks that its ¯rst argument has the form ` A⇒ B and that its second
argument is ` A. If either condition is violated, MP fails.
Disjunction introduction raises a question. What if the conclusion contains formulas
not in the premises?
¡ ` A
¡ ` A ∨B
In LCF, the formula B is supplied as an extra argument. The ML function DISJ1 has
type thm → form → thm.
Implication introduction is also called the discharge rule. It discharges a formula from
the set of assumptions, forming an implication:
¡, A ` B
¡ ` A⇒ B
The assumption A is an extra argument; DISCH has type form → thm → thm. Notation:
¡, A abbreviates ¡∪{A}; the order of assumptions does not matter in classical ¯rst-order
logic.
2.2 Quanti¯ers
Quanti¯ers bring in several concepts: substitution, bound variables, and parameters. A
common convention for substitution writes the formula A as A[t] to emphasize that it
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may have free occurrences of t. Then A[u] is the result after substituting u for those
occurrences.
In ∀x.A[x], the variable x is bound. The name is immaterial: this formula is equivalent
to ∀y.A[y]. Naive substitution can change the meaning of a formula because of clashes
among variable names. LCF renames bound variables when necessary; the Lisp code to
do this is dismayingly complex.
A parameter stands for an arbitrary, ¯xed value in a proof,1 as when we say, `let ² be
given.' LCF and many authors let any free variable serve as a parameter. Some authors
regard parameters a, b, . . . as syntactically distinct from variables x, y, . . .; parameters
cannot be bound, and theorems contain no free variables. To be `arbitrary', a parameter
must not appear in certain formulas.
Consider the universal introduction rule. If the theorem ` A[x] holds for arbitrary x,
then ` ∀y.A[y] holds. `Arbitrary' means that the assumptions ¡ have no free occurrence
of x:
¡ ` A[x]
¡ ` ∀y.A[y] x not free in ¡
The restriction on the parameter x prevents contradictions such as
x = 0 ` x = 0 assumption rule
x = 0 ` ∀y.y = 0 incorrect use of ∀-introduction
` x = 0⇒ ∀y.y = 0 ⇒-introduction
` ∀z.(z = 0⇒ ∀y.y = 0) ∀-introduction
` 0 = 0⇒ ∀y.y = 0 ∀-elimination with 0
` ∀y.y = 0 ⇒-elimination with 0 = 0
` 1 = 0 ∀-elimination with 1
In LCF, universal introduction is the function GEN of type term → thm → thm. Its
¯rst argument is the parameter x. If GEN ¯nds an occurrence of x in the assumptions,
then it fails.
The existential introduction rule is ambiguous in forwards proof:
¡ ` A[t]
¡ ` ∃x.A[x]
Which occurrences of t should be replaced by x? The premise ` 0 = 0 gives four di®erent
conclusions:
` ∃x. x = x ` ∃x. 0 = x ` ∃x. x = 0 ` ∃x. 0 = 0
To resolve the ambiguity, the function EXISTS takes two extra arguments: the term t
and the formula stating the conclusion ∃x.A[x].
2.3 Backwards proof and tactics
At the lowest level LCF executes forwards proof, but it also supports backwards proof.
The goal ¡
?
` B expresses the desired theorem ¡ ` B. A tactic is a function that reduces
a goal to a list of subgoals. The conjunction of the subgoals should imply the goal, so
repeated use of tactics forms an AND tree of goals. In LCF, this top-down decomposition
1This paper uses parameter only to mean this: never to mean an argument to a function.
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of the goal must be followed by a bottom-up reconstruction of the proof. Tactics provide
high-level assistance in the search for a proof, but a theorem can only be produced by
executing the primitive inference rules. So each tactic returns a validation function. The
validation ought to produce a theorem achieving the goal, given theorems achieving the
subgoals. If it does not, the tactic is invalid, and can only lead the user down an incorrect
path. We cannot be certain of the validations until they are applied, usually at the very
end of the proof.
In sum, a tactic maps a goal ¡
?
` B to the pair
([¡1
?
` B1, . . . , ¡n
?
` Bn], validation)
of subgoals and validation. Every tactic has the type
goal → ((goal list)× (thm list → thm)) .
For example, the tactic for conjunction introduction is called CONJ TAC. It maps any
goal of the form ¡
?
` A ∧ B to the two-element goal list [¡
?
` A, ¡
?
` B]. The validation,
which calls the rule CONJ, maps the two-element theorem list [¡ ` A, ¡ ` B] to the
theorem ¡ ` A ∧B.
Constructing the validation is routine, but there is no uniform method because the rule
may be a function taking extra arguments. The tactic for the discharge rule, DISCH TAC,
maps a goal ¡
?
` A ⇒ B to the one-element goal list [¡, A
?
` B]. It adds the antecedent,
A, to the assumptions in the subgoal. The validation calls the rule DISCH, passing the
extra argument A. The universal introduction tactic, GEN TAC, maps a goal ¡
?
` ∀x.A[x]
to one subgoal ¡
?
` A[x′], choosing the parameter x′ to di®er from all the variables in the
assumptions. The validation calls GEN, passing it x′.
When a premise of a rule contains a term not in the conclusion, its tactic requires extra
arguments to compute the subgoals. The tactic for existential introduction, EXISTS TAC,
takes a term t as an extra argument. EXISTS TAC maps a goal ¡
?
` ∃x.A[x] to the single
goal ¡
?
` A[t]. It attacks the goal `there exists an x' by stating `and that x is in fact t.'
Unfortunately, the proper choice for t, the existential witness, may not be evident. A nice
analogy has been mentioned: a program runs in order n2 time if it executes kn2 steps, for
some constant k. A proof that it runs in order n2 time should contain enough information
to deduce the value of k, but we will never ¯nd a proof if we have to guess k as the ¯rst
step.
3 Putting uni¯cation into LCF
The LCF tradition favors one-way matching over uni¯cation. An inference rule matches
theorems of a given pattern; a tactic matches goals. However, some researchers have tried
to bring the bene¯ts of uni¯cation into LCF.
Resolution tactics work on the goal's assumptions, adding new assumptions. Most
resolution tactics use one-way matching; Brian Monahan's use uni¯cation [28]. Monahan
has also automated the construction of simple rules and tactics. His function METARULE
turns any theorem P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pm ⇒ Q into the rule P1···PmQ . His METATAC produces the
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corresponding tactic. Their generality is limited because LCF's logic, PPλ, does not have
variables ranging over formulas.
Stefan SokoÃlowski used Edinburgh LCF to prove the soundness of Hoare axiomatic
rules with respect to a denotational semantics of a simple programming language [37].
The proof requires the systematic expansion of many de¯nitions. LCF's simpli¯er expands
de¯nitions by rewriting, but SokoÃlowski preferred to structure his proof in terms of derived
inference rules.
SokoÃlowski's innovation was to allow pattern variables in goals, and allow tactics to
instantiate pattern variables by uni¯cation [36]. Existential goals are an obvious use for
pattern variables. SokoÃlowski's tactics could allow the existential witness to be inferred
later in the proof.2 An environment holds instantiations of pattern variables. A uni¯cation
tactic takes an environment as well as a goal. It returns an extended environment along
with the subgoals and validation. After all subgoals have been solved, the validation is
given the ¯nal environment as well as a list of theorems.
SokoÃlowski extended Edinburgh LCF by writing uni¯cation tacticals and simple back-
tracking tactics in ML. There were problems. Edinburgh LCF executed ML slowly. The
treatment of environments during sequential composition (the tactical THEN ) may have
been faulty. Each subgoal could instantiate the environment di®erently; if the environ-
ments were incompatible then the proof would fail. I prefer to string a single environment
through the subgoals. Even so, SokoÃlowski's tactics veri¯ed the Hoare rules with remark-
able clarity, capturing the high-level structure of the proofs.
4 Reasoning with inference rules
Schmidt argues that inference rules are more natural than axioms for goal-directed proof
[34]. To illustrate the point, he develops natural deduction proof rules from the axioms of
GÄodel-Bernays set theory. The subset relation ⊆ is de¯ned by the axiom
∀AB.A ⊆ B ⇐⇒ ∀x. x ∈ A⇒ x ∈ B .
Reasoning directly from this axiom requires ¯ddling with many quanti¯ers and connectives.
Schmidt's subset introduction rule is the typical way to prove that A is a subset of B:
¡, x ∈ A ` x ∈ B
¡ ` A ⊆ B x not free in ¡
His subset elimination rule is the typical use of the knowledge that A is a subset of B:
¡ ` t ∈ A ¡ ` A ⊆ B
¡ ` t ∈ B
With these rules we can easily derive new rules, continuing to work at rule level. The
proof tree
−
¡, x ∈ A ` x ∈ A
¡ ` A ⊆ B
¡, x ∈ A ` A ⊆ B
¡, x ∈ A ` x ∈ B
¡ ` B ⊆ C
¡, x ∈ A ` B ⊆ C
¡, x ∈ A ` x ∈ C
¡ ` A ⊆ C
2SokoÃlowski was using Edinburgh LCF, which lacks existential quantifiers. The same reasoning holds
for universally quantified assumptions.
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derives the rule
¡ ` A ⊆ B ¡ ` B ⊆ C
¡ ` A ⊆ C
LCF has powerful mechanisms for deriving rules. For forwards proof, an inference
rule is a function. A new rule is derived by composing functions. For backwards proof,
an inference rule is a tactic. A new tactic is derived from other tactics using tacticals,
operators designed for this purpose. The tactical THEN composes two tactics sequentially.
The tactical REPEAT composes a tactic with itself repeatedly; it can make a proof tree
of arbitrary height, depending on the goal.
Yet LCF's derived rules and tactics do not fully support reasoning about inference
rules. In the logic PPλ, variables range over individuals, not formulas or predicates. An
induction scheme such as ` A(0) A(n) ` A(n+ 1)
` A(m)
must be implemented by a complicated function or tactic that takes the formula A as an
argument. Applying the function to some formula performs the derivation by executing
all the primitive inferences. Execution can be slow, and can fail. The only way to inspect
a derived rule or tactic is to test it: a function cannot be printed.
One solution is Gordon's higher-order logic [14]. A formula is simply a term of type
bool ; the theorem
` ∀A.A(0) ∧ (∀n.A(n)⇒ A(n+ 1))⇒ ∀m.A(m)
expresses the induction scheme. But such use of quanti¯ers and implication is precisely
what Schmidt is trying to escape. So expressed, his subset introduction rule reverts to the
axiom it was derived from:
` ∀AB. (∀x. x ∈ A⇒ x ∈ B)⇒ A ⊆ B
This approach could be used together with Monahan's METARULE and METATAC.
Isabelle's solution is to work directly with inference rules, not theorems. Represent
inference rules as explicit syntactic structures, not functions. Formal proof consists of
composing rules with each other; the resulting proof tree is a derived rule. This uni¯es
the notions of forwards and backwards proof.
Backwards proof takes place by matching a goal with the conclusion of a rule; the
premises become the subgoals. Consider the goal
?
` (A∧B)⇒ (B ∧A). Matching it with
the conclusion of the ⇒-introduction rule gives the subgoal A ∧ B
?
` B ∧ A. Composing
this with ∧-introduction gives gives two subgoals: A∧B
?
` B and A∧B
?
` A. Composing
these with the ∧-elimination rules gives two identical subgoals, A ∧ B
?
` A ∧ B, which is
an instance of the assumption rule. The proof tree is
A ∧B ` A ∧B
A ∧B ` B
A ∧B ` A ∧B
A ∧B ` A
A ∧B ` B ∧A
` (A ∧B)⇒ (B ∧A)
An inference rule is a scheme. It stands for the family of inferences obtained by
uniformly substituting hypotheses for ¡, formulas for A and B, terms for t, etc. A rule
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with no premises is an axiom scheme or theorem scheme. The example above proves the
theorem scheme ` (A ∧ B)⇒ (B ∧ A). Forwards proof takes place by matching theorem
schemes to the premises of a rule, making a new theorem scheme.
Scheme variables may have as decisive an impact on LCF as they did on provers
based on Herbrand's theorem. The Davis-Putnam method generated ground clauses.
Robinson's resolution allowed variables in clauses, whereby one clause stood for an in¯nity
of ground clauses [6, Chapter 5]. Inference rules are Horn clauses; the composition of rules
is resolution. A subtle di®erence: classical resolution is an inference rule for ¯rst-order
logic; for sentences in clause form, no other inference rule is needed. For Isabelle, resolution
builds proof trees from the inference rules of an arbitrary formal logic.
5 Formalizing quanti¯er rules
Quanti¯ers cause enormous complications. Substitution and bound variables can be han-
dled by representing logical syntax in the typed λ-calculus. Skolemization can enforce
parameter restrictions.
5.1 Substitution and the typed λ-calculus
A expression of the λ-calculus is a constant, a free variable x, a bound variable x, an
abstraction λx.t, or a combination (tu). Free variables represent scheme variables in rules,
overlined for emphasis.
Types, denoted by Greek letters α, β, . . ., are recursively formed. There is a set of
atomic types, and also function types (α→ β). Each expression has a type:
• Each variable and constant has one ¯xed type.
• If x has type α and t has type β, then the abstraction λx.t has type (α→ β).
• If t has type (α→ β) and u has type α, then the combination (tu) has type β.
The usual abbreviations save writing needless parentheses. Let λx1x2 . . . xn.t abbre-
viate λx1.λx2. . . . λxn.t, and t(u1, u2, . . . , uq) abbreviate (· · · ((tu1)u2) · · ·uq). Let α1 →
α2 → · · · → β abbreviate (α1 → (α2 → · · · → (αp → β) · · ·)).
Two λ-expressions are equal if they can be made identical by a sequence of conversions:
• α-conversion is the renaming of a bound variable: λx.t[x] = λy.t[y]
• β-conversion is substitution of an argument into the function body: (λx.t[x])u = t[u]
• η-conversion is extensionality of functions. If x is not free in t, and t has function
type, then λx.(tx) = t
For example, let us represent the syntax of propositional logic. Let term be the type
of terms, and form the type of formulas. Connectives like conjunction and implication
are in¯x constant symbols: let ∧ and ⇒ have type form → form → form. A function
represents a syntax rule: if A ∈ form and B ∈ form, then also A ∧B ∈ form.
All binding operators are represented using λ. For the universal quanti¯er, introduce
the constant ¦ of type (term → form) → form. Let B be a function from terms to
formulas: B ∈ term → form. This simply means that B(t) is a formula for all terms t.
The formula ¦(B) represents ∀y.B(y). For example, λx.R(x+0, x) has type term → form.
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Applied to a term t− 3 it yields the formula R((t− 3) + 0, t− 3), while ¦(λx.R(x+ 0, x))
represents ∀x.R(x+ 0, x).
Existential quanti¯ers can be treated as negated universals, or using another constant
§ of type (term → form)→ form. As in Gordon's HOL [13], a theorem prover can parse
and print formulas in the usual notation. Quanti¯ers become ¦(B) only in the internal
representation.
Recall the universal introduction rule:
¡ ` A[x]
¡ ` ∀y.A[y] x not free in ¡
Write the quanti¯ed formula as ¦(B). Overline ¡ and B: they are scheme variables, while
the parameter x is not a scheme variable. The rule becomes
¡ ` B(x)
¡ ` ¦(B) x not free in ¡, B
The [· · ·] notation, for substitution, has become (· · ·), for function application. There is
a further restriction on x: it may not appear in B itself. The dependence of B(x) upon
x must be purely function application. Otherwise there would be free occurrences of x in
the conclusion.
The ∀-elimination rule allows a universal theorem to be specialized to a term t. Con-
ventional syntax:
¡ ` ∀x.A[x]
¡ ` A[t]
Representation:
¡ ` ¦(B)
¡ ` B(t)
The types term and form and the connective ∧ are not part of the general framework;
even the assertion sign ` is just another constant. This representation of syntax is es-
sentially Martin-LÄof's theory of expressions [10] extended to allow more than one atomic
type. Church's λ-calculus representation of higher-order logic [13] is similar. Church al-
lows quanti¯cation over any type, with a di®erent ¦ for each; its formalization in Isabelle is
likely to resemble Martin-LÄof's ¦. The approach encompasses ¯rst-order and higher-order,
constructive and classical logics.
5.2 Parameters and Skolemization
Parameter restrictions are currently enforced by Skolemization, a representation resulting
from (too much) trial and error. The end of this section describes a more natural approach
that I intend to try.
The ∀-introduction rule, even using the ¦ representation, is not ready to be automated:
it contains a parameter restriction. Apart from this restriction, the parameter name has
no signi¯cance. The rule might as well specify a name that can never appear in B or ¡ |
neither now, nor later by instantiation of B and ¡.
Extend the object syntax with a family of subscripted parameter symbols allΓ,B for all
hypotheses ¡ and formulas B. Now symbols and expressions are mutually recursive: ¡ and
B are part of the symbol allΓ,B. Clearly allΓ,B cannot appear in ¡ or B since expressions
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are ¯nitely constructed. The occurs check of uni¯cation enforces the restriction, `not free
in ¡, B.' Using the new parameters, ∀-introduction becomes a pure Horn clause:
¡ ` B(allΓ,B)
¡ ` ¦(B)
The ∃-elimination rule also has parameter restrictions:
¡ ` ∃y.A[y] ¡, A[x] ` C
¡ ` C x not free in ¡, C
Representing the quanti¯er using § gives
¡ ` §(B) ¡, B(x) ` C
¡ ` C x not free in ¡, B,C
Decorating the parameter exi with the expressions it must not occur in gives
¡ ` §(B) ¡, B(exiΓ,B,C) ` C
¡ ` C
Schmidt also suggests natural deduction rules using Skolemization [35]. He tags a param-
eter with free variables rather than with entire expressions.
Perhaps all should not include the hypothesis, the subscript ¡. The simpler and more
e±cient rule
¡ ` B(allB)
¡ ` ¦(B)
resembles Robinson's [33]. His logic includes exempli¯cation terms, a version of Hilbert's
²-operator. The rule allows allB to appear in the hypotheses ¡. It is sound with respect
to models that assign allB a value y, if such exists, to make B(y) false. If B(allB) is true
then so is ¦(B).
Thus the symbol allΓ,B can be understood syntactically as a way of choosing a name,
or semantically as a choice function. An alternative is the function application all(¡, B),
with all (now a function symbol) and all(¡) as subexpressions. In an experiment, such
subexpressions grossly expanded the search space in higher-order uni¯cation.
Many people object to Skolemization. In a real proof, where ¡ and B are large expres-
sions, printing allΓ,B requires exponential space on the page. Isabelle has an algorithm
for compressing Skolem names to unique identi¯ers, but this works only for printing, not
input. A derived rule, like subset introduction, may contain an unnatural Skolem parame-
ter consisting of the Skolem parameters of its derivation. Unique names can be generated
by numbering (Lisp's GENSYM). But this alone does not prevent the parameter from
sneaking into ¡ or B by later instantiation.
Lincoln Wallen tells me that an acyclic graph could enforce the parameter restrictions.
The rule
¡ ` B(x)
¡ ` ¦(B) x not free in ¡, B
could be represented as a Horn clause together with a tiny graph: the parameter x would
point to ¡ and B. Instantiation of variables in ¡ and B would extend the graph. During
resolution of two rules, their graphs would be merged. The occurs check would follow
edges leading from parameters, preventing the introduction of cycles. Resolution requires
scheme variables to be standardized apart : renamed to avoid clashes with variables in
the other rule. The parameter names would also be standardized apart, preserving their
uniqueness.
Wallen [39] applies his technique to ¯rst-order logic and a modal logic. Miller [23]
describes a similar technique in the setting of higher-order logic.
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6 Higher-order uni¯cation
Unifying two expressions t and u means solving the syntactic equation t = u by instanti-
ating some of its variables. For ordinary uni¯cation, expressions are recursively built up
from variables x and function applications F (t1, . . . , tq). Two expressions are equal only if
they are identical. Expressions and variables are untyped. There are practical algorithms
for computing the most general uni¯er of two expressions, or reporting that no uni¯er
exists.
Higher-order uni¯cation amounts to solving equations in the typed λ-calculus with
respect to α, β, and possibly η-conversion [17, 19]. It is semi-decidable: if the expressions
cannot be uni¯ed, the search for uni¯ers may diverge. Although a complete set of uni¯ers
can be recursively enumerated, it may be in¯nite. Unifying the expression f(x) with the
constant A gives the two uni¯ers {f = λy.A} and {f = λy.y, x = A}. If A, B1, . . . , Bq
are distinct constants, then unifying f(x) with A(B1, . . . , Bq) gives q + 2 uni¯ers:
{f = λy.A(B1, . . . , Bq)}
{f = λy.y, x = A(B1, . . . , Bq)}
{f = λy.A(B1, . . . , Bi−1, y, Bi+1, . . . , Bq), x = Bi} i = 1, . . . , q
Unifying f(x1, x2) with A(B1, . . . , Bq) gives q2 + q + 3 uni¯ers. Too many variables make
the search space explode.
For representing ¯rst-order logic, second-order expressions su±ce: no function variable
need have functions as arguments. Marek Zaionc [40] gives a third-order example: the
expressions f(λx.x) and A have the in¯nite set of uni¯ers
{f = λy.A} {f = λy.y(A)} {f = λy.y(y(A))} and so on.
6.1 Huet's search procedure
Most implementations use Huet's procedures SIMPL and MATCH [17]. SIMPL essentially
does ¯rst-order uni¯cation. Each expression is put into head normal form:
λx1 . . . xn. F (t1, . . . , tp) ,
where F is a constant, free variable, or bound variable. Such an expression is called rigid
if F is a constant or a bound variable, and °exible if F is a free variable.
Outermost lambdas are stripped o®; the bound variables x1 . . . xn become part of the
context, behaving much like constants. The input pair of expressions is broken into a set
of disagreement pairs to be uni¯ed. A rigid-rigid pair 〈F (t1, . . . , tq), F (u1, . . . , uq)〉 is sim-
pli¯ed to the set of pairs 〈t1, u1〉, . . . , 〈tq, uq〉. If F 6= G then 〈F (t1, . . . , tp), G(u1, . . . , uq)〉
is recognized as non-uni¯able.
A pair 〈x, t〉 has the most-general uni¯er {x = t} if x does not occur in t. MATCH can
¯nd this uni¯er, but it is more e±cient if SIMPL instantiates x immediately. Function
variables complicate the occurs check: x and f(x) are uni¯ed by both {f = λy.x} and
{f = λy.y}. Huet's rigid path occurs check gives a practical su±cient condition for x and
t to be uni¯able while detecting some non-uni¯able cases. Some cases cannot be easily
classi¯ed as uni¯able or not; the implementor must decide whether an expensive search or
a missed uni¯er is the lesser evil.
MATCH guesses instantiations of variables, usually function variables. A °ex-rigid
pair
〈f(t1, . . . , tp), F (u1, . . . , uq)〉
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gives rise to as many as p+1 di®erent substitutions for f . For i = 1, 2, . . ., let hi(x1, . . . , xp)
be a new variable of appropriate type. We have
f = λx1 . . . xp. xi(h1(x1, . . . , xp), . . . , hm(x1, . . . , xp)) for certain i, by projection
f = λx1 . . . xp. F (h1(x1, . . . , xp), . . . , hq(x1, . . . , xp)) by imitation
Imitation applies whenever F is a constant, not a bound variable. Projection applies for
those i such that the type of xi allows m to be chosen to give f the correct type. If the
type of f is α1 → · · · → αp → β, then αi must be γ1 → · · · → γm → β. The second-order
case is simpler; the projections are
f = λx1 . . . xp.xi
for those i such that the argument type equals the result type, αi = β.
MATCH gives a choice of substitutions, creating an OR tree. One of these substitu-
tions is chosen, applied to all the disagreement pairs, and the search continues. SIMPL
immediately rejects a projection if ti begins with a constant di®erent from F ; imitation
reduces the disagreement pair to the pairs
〈h1(t1, . . . , tp), u1〉, . . . , 〈hq(t1, . . . , tp), uq〉 .
Sometimes both expressions begin with a free variable, the °ex-°ex case. Unifying
f(t1, . . . , tp) with g(u1, . . . , uq) yields an explosion of counterintuitive solutions [19]. Huet's
algorithm reports success when only °ex-°ex pairs remain: there is a trivial uni¯er
{f = λx1 . . . xp.h, g = λy1 . . . yq.h} .
Since the trivial uni¯er throws away too much information, a theorem prover should store
the °ex-°ex pairs as constraints on future uni¯cations.
6.2 Discussion
Here is an example: unifying f(C, x) with A(B), where A, B, and C are distinct constants.
SIMPL returns 〈f(C, x), A(B)〉. MATCH guesses three instantiations for f :
• f = λyz.y, by projection : SIMPL ¯nds 〈C,A(B)〉, a failure node.
• f = λyz.z, by projection : SIMPL instantiates x and returns success, the uni¯er
{f = λyz.z, x = A(B)}.
• f = λyz.A(g(y, z)), by imitation : SIMPL returns 〈g(C, x), B〉. MATCH guesses
three instantiations for g:
{ g = λyz.y, by projection : SIMPL ¯nds 〈C,B〉, a failure node.
{ g = λyz.z, by projection : SIMPL instantiates x and returns success, the uni¯er
{f = λyz.A(z), x = B}
{ g = λyz.B, by imitation : SIMPL returns success, {f = λyz.A(B)}
This search terminated with three uni¯ers. For an exercise, work through Zaionc's exam-
ple. The original disagreement pair soon recurs in the search tree, giving an in¯nite set of
uni¯ers.
12
Higher-order uni¯cation is e®ective if we use function variables with care. Most dis-
agreement pairs are simple assignments x = t; even assignments of function variables are
easy. Solving a recursive equation like f(t) = u(f) is hard, often causing the search to
diverge. Although the nonrecursive equation f(t1, . . . , tp) = u has the trivial solution
{f = λx1 . . . xp.u}, ¯nding its interesting solutions requires the full search. There are
many di®erent ways of projecting onto the arguments t1, . . . , tp or imitating parts of u.
For example, the equation f(0) = 0 + 0 has four solutions in f : λx.x + x, λx.x + 0,
λx.0 + x, and λx.0 + 0. The ¯rst solution is the most natural; the second and third are
sometimes useful. The last solution, produced by pure imitation, is only rarely useful.
MATCH should try projection before imitation, to produce the trivial solution last.
Are types essential? Logic programming traditionally uses no types. Higher-order
uni¯cation makes sense for a single atomic type data containing integers, booleans, strings,
and, recursively, tuples of data. But function types must be distinguished from atomic
types. In the untyped λ-calculus, it is undecidable whether an expression has a normal
form, so SIMPL could diverge. Worse, there is a ¯xedpoint combinator Y such that
Y (f) = f(Y (f)) for all expressions f . This solves any disagreement pair in MATCH:
f(t) = u(f) has the trivial solution {f = Y (λfx.u(f))}.
Huet gives a version of MATCH for uni¯cation without η-conversion [17]. The search
space expands: f need not equal λx.f(x), so many more independent substitutions are
possible. These contribute nothing even in a logic with intensional functions, provided
that λ-abstraction is only used as the syntactic representation of binding operators.
Theorem proving is undecidable, but it is unfortunate that each resolution step is
undecidable. We can recover decidability by restricting uni¯cation. Limiting the search
gives unpredictable results. Second-order matching is decidable [18], though second-order
uni¯cation is not [11]. Perhaps ¯rst-order uni¯cation plus second-order matching is a
practical compromise. Ketonen's EKL proves theorems using ¯rst-order uni¯cation plus
higher-order matching. Ketonen claims that higher-order matching is decidable, without
proof [20]; Huet tells me that decidability is an open question.
Quanti¯ers go beyond ¯rst-order uni¯cation, but where do we stop? LCF inference
rules form the union of hypotheses:
¡ ` A ¢ ` B
¡,¢ ` A ∧B
Must uni¯cation must also handle union, an associative, commutative, and idempotent
operator? Fortunately, a di®erent treatment of assumptions is possible:
¡ ` A ¡ ` B
¡ ` A ∧B
Uni¯cation cannot do everything.
7 The implementation
Isabelle consists of 3200 lines of the new Standard ML [26], compiled by David Matthew's
Poly/ML on a VAX/750 running Berkeley Unix. Both the language and Matthew's com-
piler have been assets. Type-checking means that sophisticated code often works ¯rst
time. Compiled code runs fast: examples with dozens of higher-order uni¯cations run in
seconds.
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For the typed λ-calculus, the ML type arity represents types and the ML type term
represents λ-expressions. Scheme variables are represented by (string,integer) pairs. Each
bound variable is also represented by an integer, referring to the depth at which it is bound
[4]. The environment primitives use Boyer and Moore's structure sharing [3] to standard-
ize variables apart before uni¯cation. Normalization, α-convertibility, and substitution
functions are provided. The λ-expression parser and printer are extensible. Each can be
invoked in mutual recursion with parsing/printing functions written for a particular logical
syntax.
Higher-order uni¯cation returns a possibly in¯nite stream of uni¯ers. Streams are
implemented as usual: each member contains a function for computing the rest of the
stream. The occurs check is slow: each assignment x = t requires scanning t for x.
Omitted in Prolog, the occurs check is essential for enforcing parameter restrictions. Large
expressions, representing assumption lists, must be scanned.
The type rule and the function Resolve provide the basic inference mechanism. In
backwards proof, the goal tree is a rule Q1···QnP . The root P is the initial goal, the leaves
Q1 · · ·Qn are the unanalyzed subgoals. Resolving a subgoal with a rule produces a new
goal tree. At present, Isabelle does not store the tree of resolution steps underlying a rule;
as a result, a goal tree has no internal subgoal structure.
An Isabelle tactic is a function on inference rules, regarded as goal trees. It has type
rule → (rule stream): it may return a stream of trees. A tactic for goal-directed proof
just replaces some leaves, but any function on goal trees is a tactic. RulesTac uni¯es the
conclusion of several rules against a goal. There are two levels of choice: several rules
may apply; a rule may have several uni¯ers with the goal. The tactical DEPTH FIRST
repeatedly applies a tactic in depth-¯rst search. If the tactic returns an empty stream of
goal trees, then the goal is abandoned. SokoÃlowski used depth-¯rst search for backwards
chaining along hypotheses [37]. It is also e®ective with introduction rules. Together with
RulesTac it constitutes a higher-order Prolog interpreter. It can execute trivial Prolog
programs (slowly).
The interactive goal package maintains the current proof state. When applying a
tactic, the package uses the ¯rst set of subgoals produced, saving the remainder of the
stream. The user can explicitly backtrack any past step: discard the current goal tree,
taking the next tree from that point. The backtrack command fails if the stream for that
step is empty.
In the original goal, scheme variables are useful placeholders for information that is
irrelevant or unknown. New variables crop up as existential witnesses. During the proof,
scheme variables develop gradually and naturally. A variable may occur in more than one
goal; instantiation a®ects all goals simultaneously.
To minimize backtracking, goals must be tackled in a sensible order. A variable in a
critical place leaves the search unconstrained; a goal is too °exible if its variables allow too
many rules to unify. Experimental depth-¯rst tacticals control the search by expanding
only `appropriate' goals. One argument of DEPTH FIRST is a predicate for classifying
a goal as satis¯ed or unsatis¯ed. One argument of DepthRulesFunTac is a function for
analyzing a goal, computing the list of appropriate rules. The function can defer a goal by
returning an empty rule list. Deferred goals can be reconsidered as the search proceeds;
the search stops when all remaining goals continue to be deferred. A goal can be deferred
for any reason, not just if too °exible. A typical application would be to conduct a proof
in stages: solving all equational goals, while leaving the others until later.
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8 Experiments with Constructive Type Theory
Isabelle has been set up for Martin-LÄof's Constructive Type Theory, with a parser and
printer for its syntax, and tactics for solving typical problems. This thirty percent of the
code is kept separate from the rest.
8.1 Constructive Type Theory
Martin-LÄof's Type Theory is an attempt to formalize constructive reasoning [21, 29]. It in-
terprets propositions as types: the rules for each logical connective express its constructive
meaning as operations on proof objects, elements of the corresponding type. For instance,
the proposition A ∧ B is interpreted as the Cartesian product A × B: a proof of A ∧ B
is a pair 〈a, b〉, where a is a proof of A and b is a proof of B. The proof objects form a
simple functional programming language. All computations terminate, though the set of
functions is much larger than the set of primitive recursive functions.
People are using Constructive Type Theory for program veri¯cation and derivation.
By `propositions as types', a small family of primitives provides a full system of logical
connectives, data structures, and programs. A type can express a complete formal speci-
¯cation: the type of a sorting function can assert that its output is a sorted permutation
of its input. Petersson has implemented Type Theory by modifying Edinburgh LCF [32].
PRL supports a related type theory using ideas from LCF [9].
Type Theory has several kinds of rules:
• Formation rules build types from other types.
• Introduction rules build elements of types. By `propositions as types', they also
introduce logical connectives.
• Elimination rules specify control structures, called selectors, for each type: discrim-
ination for sum types, projections for product types, application for function types,
and primitive recursion for recursive types. By `propositions as types', they also
eliminate logical connectives.
• Equality rules give the result of evaluating expressions.
8.2 Functions and the theory of expressions
A higher-order syntax is practically essential. While predicate calculus has only two
binding operators, ∀ and ∃, Type Theory has ¦, §, split, when, etc., with various
binding rules. Martin-LÄof's theory of expressions [10] is formally equivalent to the typed
λ-calculus with the single ground type (). The notation and terminology are di®erent,
especially for types. Martin-LÄof uses the word arity, reserving type for the types described
by the inference rules. Let us adopt this convention for now.
There are two sets of notation because there are two kinds of function: the arity α→ β
and the (Martin-LÄof) type A ⇒ B. If A and B are types, then A ⇒ B is the type of
functions from A to B, and corresponds to logical implication. Call an expression of arity
α → β a function, and an element of type A ⇒ B a function object. An expression
of function arity is also called unsaturated, while an expression of atomic arity is called
saturated. These concepts are due to Gottlob Frege [1]. Functions play important roles in
the rules, but only saturated expressions can denote types or elements of types: a single
expression cannot be both a function and a function object.
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Consider the function λxy.R(x + y, x). Martin-LÄof writes this as (x, y)R(x + y, x),
reserving λ for function objects. I ¯nd this hard to read, preferring the traditional λ-
notation, or λ(x, y)R(x + y, x) as a compromise. I use lambda for abstraction of func-
tion objects. If b is a function, then its extension is lambda(x)b(x), a function object.
There are also two forms of application: for functions, b(t); for function objects, f ∗ t or
apply(f, t). The Type Theory rule for β-conversion de¯nes application of function objects
in terms of application of functions: (lambda(x)b(x)) ∗ t = b(t). The η-conversion rule is
lambda(x)(c ∗x) = c. These rules are needed even though the syntactic theory has both
β and η conversion.
The distinction between functions and function objects is not just for Type Theory.
There will be other logics whose notion of function cannot be identi¯ed with the λ-calculus
functions. The λ-calculus representation does not prejudice the notion of function in the
logic.
8.3 The rules on the computer
The theorems of Type Theory are called judgements. A judgement of the form A type
means that A is a type, while a ∈ A means that a is an element of type A. A judgement
can have assumptions, an ordered list x1 ∈ A1, . . ., xn ∈ An. Using an assumption a ∈ A
means searching down the list for a, then verifying that A is a type. The Isabelle rules
use the Prolog style of list processing:
¡ ` A type
¡, a ∈ A ` a ∈ A
¡ ` a ∈ A
¡, b ∈ B ` a ∈ A
The product introduction rule is handled like ∀-introduction. First of all, Martin-LÄof
uses the binding operator ¦ for product types. The type
∏
y∈AB(y) corresponds to the
proposition ∀y ∈ A .B(y). Elements of the type are function objects. The rule is written
¡ ` A type ¡, x ∈ A ` b(x) ∈ B(x)
¡ ` lambda(y)b(y) ∈ ∏y∈AB(y) x not free in ¡
In the λ-calculus syntactic representation, the binding operators ¦ and lambda are
used as constant symbols. The representation of
∏
y∈AB(y) is ¦(A,B); the representation
of lambda(x)b(x) is lambda(b). Then making scheme variables explicit gives
¡ ` A type ¡, x ∈ A ` b(x) ∈ B(x)
¡ ` lambda(b) ∈ ¦(A,B) x not free in ¡, b, B
Using the Skolem constant priΓ,b,B, for product introduction, gives
¡ ` A type ¡,priΓ,b,B ∈ A ` b(priΓ,b,B) ∈ B(priΓ,b,B)
¡ ` lambda(b) ∈ ¦(A,B)
In Isabelle, the Type Theory parser, read rule, is called from ML. The premises are an ML
list of strings; each variable is indicated by a pre¯xed question mark; Skolem subscripts
are in square brackets:
val ProdIntrRl = read_rule
( [ "?H |- ?A type",
"?H, pri[?b1,?B1]: ?A |- ?b1(pri[?b1,?B1]) : ?B1(pri[?b1,?B1])" ] ,
{ ------------------------------------------------------------------- }
"?H |- lambda(?b1) : Prod(?A,?B1)" );
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The horizontal line is simply an ML comment. Omitting the subscript ¡ (ASCII syntax
?H) is an old mistake that I have not gotten round to ¯xing, since there are a dozen similar
rules.
8.4 Tactics
Tactics, built from standard primitives, can solve problems expressed in Type Theory.
Checking that a type A is well-formed takes place by using formation rules to prove the
judgement A type.
By uni¯cation, a rule can specify more than one direction of information °ow. In
Prolog this is called multi-mode execution: programs can run backwards. The judgement
a ∈ A has several meanings:
• It can mean a is a program of type A. Given a program a, proving a ∈ A determines
the type of a. Type inference comes for free, while Gothenburg's Type Theory system
[32] directly implements Milner's algorithm, a lot of code using explicit uni¯cation
[25]. A group at INRIA also obtain the e®ect of Milner's algorithm by executing
inference rules [7].
• It can mean a is a proof of the proposition A. Given a proposition A, proving
a ∈ A gives a constructive proof of A . While this is undecidable, repeated use of
introduction rules performs a large portion of the proof.
• It can mean a is a program with speci¯cation A. Given a speci¯cation A, proving
a ∈ A amounts to the program synthesis of a.
The tactic DepthIntrTac uses DepthRulesFunTac to handle variables sensibly in the
formation and introduction rules. The goal A type is deferred if A is a variable. For a ∈ A
either a or A must not be a variable. TypeCheckTac is similar but uses elimination rules
as well as formation and introduction rules. For a ∈ A it requires a to be rigid, since if a
is a variable then all the elimination rules apply. TypeCheckTac handles the type-checking
problems that have come up in my experiments. It can check the type of the addition
operator, as de¯ned by primitive recursion. Solving the goal
lambda(k) lambda(m) rec(m, λ(x, y) succ(y), k) ∈ A
assigns A = Nat⇒ Nat⇒ Nat.
A Type Theory function takes apart its arguments using the awkward selector oper-
ators. An ML function is de¯ned by equations on its patterns of input. To support a
pattern-directed style for Type Theory, I have experimented with tactics for manipulating
equations. Some examples go through with little guidance. For the predecessor function
the tactics discover that pred = lambda(x) rec(x, λ(y, z)y, x) with type A = Nat⇒ Nat
by solving the goal
x ∈
∑
pred∈A
pred ∗ 0 = 0 × ∏
k∈Nat
pred ∗ succ(k) = k
 .
The function fst , on product types, takes the ¯rst component of a pair 〈a, b〉. The tactics
discover that fst = lambda(x) split(λ(y, z)y, x) with type A = (Nat×Nat)⇒ Nat:
x ∈
∑
fst∈A
∏
i∈Nat
∏
j∈Nat
fst ∗ 〈i, j〉 = i
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This example involves both product and sum types. The tactics discover a binding for
f using the selectors when and split.
x ∈
∏
i∈Nat
∏
j∈Nat
f(inl〈i, j〉) = i × f(inr〈i, j〉) = j
Such use of function variables can cause uni¯cation problems. An arithmetic addition
function can be discovered, but addition as a function object of type Nat ⇒ Nat ⇒
Nat performs computation on both numbers and function types. Its derivation produces
subgoals containing unsimpli¯ed recursion equations; uni¯cation diverges.
9 Related work
The earliest applications of higher-order uni¯cation extended resolution to higher-order
logic [19]. Huet's constrained resolution postponed branching in uni¯cation [16]. Rather
than returning multiple uni¯ers in a resolution step, it recorded the remaining disagree-
ment pairs as constraints on the new clause. Further resolutions satis¯ed the constraints
or rendered them clearly non-uni¯able. Constrained resolution went beyond using only
°ex-°ex disagreement pairs, which are always uni¯able, as constraints.
The TPS theorem prover uses sophisticated heuristics in the search for higher-order
uni¯ers [24]. In MATCH it chooses a disagreement pair likely to cause the least branching
of the tree. It hashes disagreement sets to determine whether a new set is subsumed
by an older one. Though the subsumption test is expensive it cuts the search space
substantially and prevents some searches from diverging. TPS uses general matings rather
than resolution. The mating approach uni¯es subformulas against each other without
reducing everything to clause form. TPS can automatically prove Cantor's Theorem:
every set has more subsets than elements [2]. Uni¯cation discovers the diagonalization
function.
The EKL proof checker uses higher-order matching of rewrite rules [20]. N. G. de
Bruijn's AUTOMATH project has investigated several higher-order λ-calculi, reminiscent
of Martin-LÄof's type theory, as languages for machine-checked proof [5]. Huet and Co-
quand's theory of constructions is a natural development from AUTOMATH [8]. Gordon's
HOL is a version of LCF for proving theorems in Church's higher-order logic [13]. The
logics of HOL, EKL, and TPS are all descended from Church's.
Gilles Kahn and his group execute operational semantics expressed as inference rules.
The rules are preprocessed, then translated into Prolog. They have considered the dynamic
semantics of several simple languages, and ML type-checking [7]. The system runs inside
the structure editor Mentor, providing type-checking and execution of the program being
edited.
10 Future
Though Isabelle can handle small examples, much work remains before interesting proofs
can be attempted.
Quanti¯ers have been the number one trouble spot. A list of failed approaches would
¯ll the page. Skolem constants work but are clumsy. I hope that the acyclic dependency
graph will work.
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LCF's simpli¯er uses equations as rewrite rules. Proving (i + j) + k = i + (j + k)
should be trivial: use induction on i, then simplify the base and step subgoals. Without
a simpli¯er, this is impossibly tedious. LCF ideas may need drastic change because of
uni¯cation.
Higher-order uni¯cation behaves well if not provoked by unreasonable use of function
variables. Most of the time ¯rst-order uni¯cation takes place, so Isabelle does not require
the TPS subsumption test. Decidable restrictions of uni¯cation should be found.
An LCF theory is a data base of constants, types, axioms, and theorems. At present,
Isabelle allows only simple abbreviations. We need methods for combining theories and
working in di®erent logics.
The user interface is crude. In LCF, the logic is integrated with ML; in Isabelle, the
parser and printer must be invoked. Goals are designated by number; a high-resolution
display and mouse would help.
Other logics must be considered to test whether Isabelle is really general. One can-
didate is the Logical Theory [10], a ¯rst-order intuitionistic logic in which Type Theory
can be constructed. Something radically di®erent, like a Hoare logic or a temporal logic,
should be attempted.
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